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Abstract
This paper presents a concrete definition of what a Safety Instrumen-
ted System (SIS) is. This involves important concepts such as risk, sa-
fety integrity level, SIL, life cycle and protection layer. The aim of this 
paper is to provide readers with a concise definition of SIS. To this end, 
the basic elements of a SIS are defined, the relationship of risk with a 
SIS is presented, layers of protection are defined in a industrial process, 
the implementation of a SIS is justified, and the correct methodology 
for the implementation of a SIS is obtained, namely Lifecycle. Finally, 
the paper describes a mathematical method for modeling and validating 
a particular SIS based on standards.
Key words
Safety Instrumented System, SIS, Risk, safety integrity level, SIL, Li-
fecycle, Protection layer 
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1. Introduction
A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) is an 
engineering concept that redefines security 
structure in industrial processes. This con-
cept involves a broader study of plants, pro-
cesses, systems security, systems of mea-
surement and control. A SIS arises from the 
need to handle dangerous conditions that 
emerge in plants, where the main purpose is 
to quantify and reduce the risk so as to take 
it to acceptable levels. The present paper is 
intended to define SIS and present the most 
relevant concepts related to it. 
Section 2 of this paper presents the basic ele-
ments of a SIS. The third section shows how 
risk and SIS are related. Additionally, a pre-
sentation of the layers of protection is made. 
Section 4 explains the rationale behind the 
implementation of a SIS, the Section 5 illus-
trates the design methodology. Finally, the pa-
per introduces the so called Lifecycle as well 
as the associated mathematical model.
2. Elements of a SIS
A SIS consists of the following instruments: 
sensors, controls and actuators, which are 
used in order to make the plant reach speci-
fic safety standards (a safety state) whenever 
the operating conditions of the plant lead to 
hazardous environments or to certain risk. A 
SIS is recommended to be separated from the 
Basic Process Control System (BPCS). This 
condition allows separating features for pro-
cess requirements and safety, and also facili-
tates the diagnosis and maintenance for each 
of the systems (see Fig 1). BPCS is an active 
system that meets regulatory tasks of the pro-
cess. A SIS is passive and is intended for long 
periods of time without taking any action, but 
it must be prepared to act whenever neces-
sary. For these reasons, such a system should 
be monitored and maintained regularly.
Figure 1. SIS vs BPCS 
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3. Risk
A SIS has three basic elements, namely a 
processing system, actuators and sensors. 
This set of elements defines the safety inte-
grity level (SIL) (see Figure 2). SIL is asso-
ciated with a probability of dangerous failure 
of the system, and it can be determined after 
conducting a risk analysis. Risk is a measu-
rement of the likelihood and severity of an 
event, in this case unwanted. These measu-
rements address questions like: what are the 
consequences of the event? How frequent the 
event might be?
Figure 2. Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Safety Integrity 
Level
Probability of dangerous 
failure Risk reduction factor
SIL 4 0.0001-0.00001 100000 to 10000
SIL 3 0.001-0.0001 10000 to 1000
SIL 2 0.01-0.001 1000 to 100
SIL 1 0.1-0.01 100 to 10
            Source: own elaboration
The risk in an industrial process decreases 
by implementing protective layers (Figures 3 
and 4). All process or plants involve a risk. 
Companies are responsible for determining 
their acceptable levels of risk. Protective 
layers are divided according to two aspects: 
prevention and mitigation. When certain ha-
zardous conditions are associated to a pro-
cess, prevention layers lead the process to 
normal condition. Mitigation layers only act 
when a disaster has already occurred, and so 
are intended to try to reduce its impact.
Figure 3. Protective layers, ER: Emergency Response, PP: Physical Protection 
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Figure 4. Decreased Risk 
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In this context, SIL establishes a probability 
of failure, determined through risk analysis 
for a system with a SIS. In the ISA S84.01 
standard SIL is defined as a set of discrete 
levels of security based on the probability of 
dangerous failure of a given system (Figure 
4). In practice, for implementation, SIL sys-
tems 1 and 2 are actually achievable; SIL 
systems 3 and 4 are difficult or impossible to 
achieve due to the small failure probabilities. 
Thus, a SIS helps to reduce risk and therefo-
re represents a layer of prevention within an 
industrial process.
4. The rationale behind SIS
There are various reasons to justify the 
existence of SIS, [4]. For example, the oil 
industry lost nearly $2 trillion by accident 
in the early 90’s [5]. In other words, not ha-
ving a SIS is more expensive than acquiring 
a new one. The actual causes of accidents 
are attributed, in 44% of the cases, to a bad 
design and poor specifications made  in sys-
tems; on the other hand, 20% is attributed 
to changes that are not recorded after the 
start of a process (Figure 5).
 
Figure 5. Cause of accident 
Source: [6].
From the point of view of a cost-benefit analy-
sis, the cost of implementing a SIS is much 
lower than losing human lives, causing dama-
190
lUis EFrén BArrEro páEz - Andrés EsCoBAr díAz - HArold VACCA gonzálEz
Universidad distrital Francisco José de Caldas - technological Faculty
ge to the environment, paying liability costs, 
reducing production, or doing harm to equi-
pment, infrastructure and ultimately to the 
image of a company.
5. Life cycle
Finally, the implementation of a SIS must fo-
llow various steps, namely the lifecycle design 
[7] (Figure 6). If the methodology is followed, it 
guarantees that: SIS Reduces costs, increases 
process safety, ensures compliance with regula-
tions and provides an example of good enginee-
ring practice. The methodology has three sta-
ges: Analysis, Implementation and Operation. 
These stages describe the activities necessary 
for the completion of a SIS; from conception to 
the complete deployment of the system.
Figure 6. Life cycle of a SIS 
                            Source: [5].
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6. Mathematical Model
To the best of our knowledge, very few works 
exist in the literature that address control al-
gorithm development and validation for SIS 
based on a mathematical method. 
Recently, [8] described a mathematical 
method for modeling and validating SIS ba-
sed on IEC standards. Such an approach 
considered diagnosis and treatment for each 
safety instrumented function (SIF) including 
hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies on 
the equipment or system under control. For 
modeling critical-fault diagnosis, Bayesian 
networks (BN) and Behavioral Petri nets 
(BPN) are suggested. For modeling critical-
fault treatment, interpreted Petri nets (PN) 
are suggested, since this approach is based on 
the behavior of dynamic systems, as oriented 
by occurrence of discrete events, according 
to discrete event dynamic systems (DEDS). 
Additionally, coordination modeling is used to 
link each treatment model to a corresponding 
diagnostic model. Also, for these coordination 
models, interpreted Petri nets are suggested. 
The mathematical model generated will allow 
the validation of the control algorithm by pro-
viding a computational resource that ensures 
compliance with the SIL specifications ac-
cording to IEC 61508. Finally, these models 
can be translated into any language defined 
by IEC 61131-3, in accordance to standard 
IEC 61511 (IEC, 2003a), and implemented 
using Safety Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLC), as a layer of risk reduction separated 
from Basic Process Control Systems (BPCS).
First, a Bayesian network is a structure that 
graphically models relationships of probabilis-
tic dependence of cause-effect, considering a 
group of variables. The BN provides a method 
of reasoning used to represent partial beliefs 
under conditions of uncertainty. The construc-
tion of a structured Bayesian Network can be 
accomplished from either a database obtained 
from a process, or from domain knowledge. In 
the last decade, many Bayesian-network struc-
tured-learning algorithms have been developed. 
These algorithms generally fall into two groups, 
namely search- & scoring-based algorithms and 
dependency analysis-based algorithms.
Second, the PN, considered as a tool that allows 
a graphical and mathematical description of the 
system, is a communication tool among people 
related with the project, interpretation and 
clear identification of the states and actions. 
PN can represent processes with synchro-
nism, concurrency, causality, conflict, and tho-
se that share resources and normal situations 
in productive systems (PS). The mathematical 
support of PN is useful for performing the for-
mal tests of the dynamic properties of the sys-
tem. This is especially useful in applications in 
which security is a relevant factor.
Third, a BPN is an ordinary PN with an addi-
tional OR-transition intended to model fault 
propagation among multiple paths by consi-
dering a set of observations about a process. 
BPN is a type of PN that models a diagnos-
tic process since no cyclic process has to be 
represented. In this context, the process of 
a Bayesian network (BN) can be represen-
ted through a BPN. If two effects are inde-
pendent of a cause based on database, then 
an OR-transition is considered, but if the two 
effects are dependent (i.e. both effects take 
place when a cause is present), then the AND 
transition is considered.
Figure 7 shows the mathematical method for 
modeling and validating control algorithms 
for SIS design based on BN, BPN and PN, [8].
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Figure 7. Mathematical method for critical fault diagnosis and treatment in SIS design
                 Source: [8]
The method defines four steps, namely (A) 
modeling, (B) analysis, (C) generation of con-
trol algorithms and (D) acceptance tests. The 
modeling step is divided into two comple-
mentary stages: (A1) critical fault diagnosis 
and (A2) critical fault treatment and coordi-
nation. Step (B) (i.e. analysis) is performed to 
both verify if some PN properties for critical 
fault diagnosis, treatment and coordination 
integrated models are met, and validate inte-
grated models in compliance with specifica-
tions. Liveness, safety, conservativeness and 
reachability properties should be verified for 
SIS applications. Step (C) (i.e. generation of 
control algorithms) is performed to convert 
verified models into a language recommen-
ded by standard IEC 61131-3 (IEC, 2003b) 
and accepted by IEC 61511 (IEC, 2003a) for 
implementation in a Safety PLC. Finally, Step 
(D) (i.e. acceptance tests) is performed in 
accordance to IEC 61511 in order to valida-
te whether a control algorithm for each SIF 
complies with the specifications.
7. Conclusions
This document provided specific and general 
concepts, terms, relevance and methodologies 
associated to a SIS. This paper will motivate 
readers to get involved and deepen their un-
derstanding of these topics, especially when 
addressing control-algorithm development 
and validation for SIS based on mathematical 
models for the study of these systems.
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